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Following the financial and economic crisis that began in 2008, innovative forms of 
mobilization emerged in several cities across the globe. Protests combined high levels of 
political discontent with strong opposition to austerity measures, which substantially 
reduced the social investment of the states. The anti-austerity movements in Europe 
were far from homogeneous, presenting important differences between countries and 
within these countries themselves in the type of protests, intensities and durations 
(Flesher Fominaya, 2017). 
The anti-austerity movements in Europe provide valuable information on how 
different political, economic and cultural contexts can influence mobilization within the 
same financial system through a nuanced exploration of the relationship between 
different political-economic configurations and patterns of protest (e.g. della Porta, 
2015). The scholarly analysis of this protest cycle engages with central debates of the 
previous decades: 1) the importance of grievances, 2) the role of emotions in 
mobilization, 3) new types of organizers versus traditional actors, 4) the activist use of 
digital media, 5) the synergetic framing of two crises (financial economy and 
representative democracy) and new cross-class alliances, 6) continuities and breaks 
with previous cycles of contention, and 7) the effects of public opinion dynamics, 
violence, media, and the use of the public space. This chapter reviews the main 
evidence found regarding anti-austerity movements in Europe, explains the highly 
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disruptive capacity of unconventional types of mobilizing structures, such as the French 
Gilets jaunes (yellow vests) and the Spanish Indignados, stressing the growing 
importance of ‘affiliation distrust’ and other demand-side factors. 
Grievances  
Grievances alone do not produce protest automatically, but ‘at the heart of every protest 
are grievances’ (Stekelemburg & Klanedermans, 2010: 2). In those countries hardest hit 
by the financial crisis, particularly in Southern Europe and Ireland, the austerity 
measures imposed by the Troika — a decision group formed by the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund — led to 
severe cuts to pensions, public services and education spending. In Greece, 
unemployment increased from 7% to 28% between 2008 and 2013, reaching 60% 
among young people. Similar figures were attained in Spain, with unemployment rising 
from 8% to 27%, exceeding 55% among young people. Evidence shows an increase of 
suicide rates in most European countries, particularly in regions with higher levels of job 
loss (Chang et al., 2013), and among men, especially unemployed ‘family breadwinners’ 
or at risk of eviction (e.g. Rachiotis et al., 2015). High increase in suicide rates was 
registered among males in Spain —14% higher in 2012 compared to the year before 
(Ruiz-Pérez et al., 2017) — and in Greece, 35% higher in 2012 compared to 2010 
(Rachiotis et al., 2015). 
The so-called ‘Great Recession’ in these countries produced a social climate of 
increasing distress and fear about the further evolution of the economic situation, with 
experts speculating the possibility of their country being expelled from the euro, the 
unavailability of payments to officials, pensions and intervention of the national 
government by the Troika. In many cities, new food banks were created to face the 
increasing number of households needing food, due to the rise of unemployment and 
precarity (see Kousis and Paschou, this volume). Across several countries, a vast 
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majority of the population felt that, for the first time in decades, one generation lived 
worse than previous generations. In fact, the important intergenerational improvement of 
income taking place after the Second World War was interrupted for the generation born 
in the early 80's, particularly in countries such as Greece, Spain, and Italy, and, to a 
lesser extent, in the United Kingdom, Denmark or Finland (Rahman & Tomlinson, 2018).  
An important part of the population perceived austerity as an exogenous shock, 
directly producing a decline of their living standards. The progressive erosion of political 
support among the European population since the 1990's is well documented (e.g. 
Norris, 2011), as well as how this was aggravated by the economic crisis and the 
increasing distrust in political institutions and elites (Lobera, 2015). As Andretta and della 
Porta (2015: 49) note, the spreading of anti-austerity protests in many countries ‘has 
brought about a renewed attention of the structural socio-economic transformations 
producing different grievances and collective action’, mostly paying attention to 
grievance interpretation and framing. Understanding the acute connection between two 
‘intertwined crises’, political and economic ―as stressed by many analyses (e.g. Flesher 
Fominaya, 2017; della Porta, 2015; Lobera, 2011a) ― is essential in explaining the 
European anti-austerity protests and the way they framed grievances. 
Emotions 
Emotions occupied a relevant place in most analysis of the anti-austerity mobilizations, 
particularly of the so-called ‘square movements’, such as the Indignados mobilizations 
in Spain (also known as 15M movement), the Aganaktismeni in Greece, and hundreds of 
Occupy mobilizations in several other countries, including notably Britain and Belgium. 
Arguably, there is nothing new about the central role emotions played in these 
movements (Cossarini, 2014); there are no politics nor political theory without emotions. 
But, certainly, the study of this protest cycle increased the already growing interest since 
late 1990's regarding the role of emotions in mobilization, and more broadly in all social 
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action, as a provider of both motivation and goals (Jasper, 1998). Emotions and passion, 
as much as interests and ideologies, drive individuals to mobilize and join collective 
actions (Goodwin et al., 2004). 
Research in Greece and Spain showed that protestors were motivated to join 
collective mobilizations by their ‘moral outrage’, followed by anger and sadness (Simiti, 
2015: 26; Likki, 2013: 10-11). Some scholars, like Castells (2012) and Langman (2013), 
included ‘hope’ as one of most defining emotions of the square movements, although 
evidence showed low levels of this emotion among the participants, suggesting that 
despite their mobilization they ‘were reserved in their hopes’ that their main grievances 
would be resolved soon (Likki, 2013:11). 
Spain’s ¡Democracia Real Ya! (Real Democracy Now), one of the platforms that 
played a key initiator role in the mobilizations, called in these terms for an end of citizen 
apathy, and a facing up to the unjust situation: 
We can vote, but we don’t have a voice. (…) We don’t understand why we need to 
pay the bills of a crisis whose authors continue to enjoy record benefits. We are 
fed up with injustices (15M manifesto ‘How to Cook a Non-violent Revolution’, 
2011).  
Their claims refer to the bestselling tract Indignez-vous! (Time for Outrage! in the English 
translation), by the former French Resistance member and concentration camp survivor 
Stéphane Hessel (2010: 22):  
The worst possible outlook is indifference that says, ‘I can’t do anything about it; 
I’ll just get by.’ Behaving like that deprives you of one of the essentials of being 
human: the capacity and the freedom to feel outraged. That freedom is 
indispensable, as is the political involvement that goes with it. 
Certainly, a ‘strategic’ vision was present within the initiating platforms and autonomous 
movements in this translation of the rapidly spreading ‘Indignation’ frames, aimed to 
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mobilize emotions to encourage participation (Cossarini, 2014; Tejerina & Perugorría, 
2017). Doing so, they obtained some cases of great success of participation, such as 
the Spanish Indignados movement. They strategically framed and mobilized collective 
emotions, increasing group solidarity and strengthening the ‘emotional energy’ of 
collective actions (Collins, 2001).  
Humour also played an instrumental role in some mobilizations, which combined 
indignation directed at politicians and bankers with a wide range of strategically 
designed actions and protests. As Romanos (2016a: e039) notes for the Spanish case, 
activists organized ‘workshops to promote imaginative and ironic messages on 
placards, performances explicitly seeking an emotional connection to the public, the 
development of specific humour-driven initiatives within the committees, and the 
application of skills and technical expertise related to advertising and distribution of 
content on the Internet’. Strategic use of humour in political protest (Hart, 2007) has 
been remarkably more visible and analysed in the last decades (e.g. Bruner 2005, 
Flesher Fominaya 2007, Romanos, 2016a).  
Due to the unpredictable nature of ’cycles of contention’, emotions may evolve 
differently based on the responses of elites, opponents, and potential allies (Tarrow, 
2011: 201), and result in new positive or negative emotions. As an example of evolution 
of negative emotions, a British activist refers to the interplay between police response, 
media representation, public opinion, and self-reflexivity within the movement: ‘Our 
reaction against police intimidation was quite forceful and was perceived as quite 
threatening to people outside of the activist milieu, and that created tensions within the 
movement’ (Cammaerts, 2018: 177). During the protests, many ordinary citizens 
expressed a sense of ‘despair and submission’: ‘We know we are being exploited, but 
we are aware also that there is absolutely nothing we can do about it’ (2018: 178).  
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According to some activists, this ‘fatalistic submission’ may be explained by a 
‘deliberately cultivated collective depression’ to accept the existing situation (Fisher, 
2014). Yet, some scholars have studied the recent expansion of the state’s power to 
control youth dissent by extending the reach of criminal law, surveillance of public 
spaces, ‘gag laws’ and other sources of repression (e.g. Bessant & Grasso, 2018). 
Portos and Calvo (2018: 49) have analysed recent institutional actions in Spain aimed at 
stimulating the perception of threat around the young, as part of a what they call a new 
‘regime of governance of young people’, where fear, soft repression, hard punishment, 
securitization and surveillance are key elements. In this vein, Cammaerts (2018: 178) 
warns that sentiments of powerlessness among the population are often accompanied 
by an “anger and sense of victimhood which desperately looks for others to blame (cf. 
immigrants or those on benefits)”, diverting the emotional energy of anti-austerity 
protests out of the elites. 
In sum, the analysis of anti-austerity protests has led to an increasing interest in 
the affective and emotional dimensions, both as dependent and independent variables. 
Certainly, the emotions of the participants (and non-participants) can be modified or 
intensified by the protests (Jasper, 1998; Collins, 2001; della Porta 2008), and the 
dynamics of the protests are affected by changes in the emotions of potential 
participants. Likewise, it is crucial to obtain a deeper understanding of how mobilization 
dynamics are affected by changes in the public opinion climate (e.g. Snow et al., 1986; 
Gamson, 1992), since the way that non-activist citizens react may have an important 
effect on the evolution of the contentious process (Gamson, 1992; Koopmans, 2004).  
Institutional left and autonomous actors  
Even though the financial crisis in Europe ignited in 2008, the massive responses in the 
streets were not immediate. Some trade unions’ protests, student mobilizations, and the 
Iceland ‘Saucepan Revolution’ in 2009-10 were the predecessors of the anti-austerity 
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cycle of contention (Zamponi, 2012; Júlíusson & Helgason, 2013). Mostly, the 
successive calls for protests, both from the institutional left (i.e. trade unions and smaller 
parties) and from the autonomous movements, did not include massive participation 
until the May 5, 2010 general strike in Greece (heavily affected early in the process). 
General strikes and mass demonstrations swept the country for weeks — accompanied 
by controversial and deadly police actions — protesting against the government plans to 
cut public spending and raise taxes in exchange for a €110 billion bail-out by the Troika, 
aimed at solving the Greek debt crisis. 
Peterson et al. (2015: 2) argue that massive mobilizations took place in Europe 
‘first after the new politics of austerity began to take shape’ and ‘their impact on the 
everyday lives of people became all too evident’. Nevertheless, the countries most 
affected by the global financial crisis and the Troika’s demands for financial austerity 
had ‘strongly different mobilization responses’ (Flesher Fominaya, 2017: 3): Greece and 
Spain having massive and sustained mobilizations while Italy, Portugal, and Ireland had 
relatively moderate ones. Several factors have been analysed to explain these 
differences, as we will see in the last section. 
The ‘most innovative’ forms of mobilizations succeed in mobilising a broad 
constituency including older people, people with more diverse incomes and/or 
education than the typical Left-wing protester (e.g. della Porta, 2014), as well as to count 
with remarkable cross-sectional support among the public (Sampedro & Lobera, 2014). 
According to Peterson et al. (2015: 13), these newer movements ‘have indisputably 
captured the imagination and enthusiasm of social movement scholars’ and grabbed 
most of the media attention, sometimes silencing the mobilizations of more traditional 
actors, such as trade unions.  
Yet, trade unions played an important role in several countries. For example, 
della Porta et al. (2012) show that, although unsung, they were the single most effective 
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civil society actor organizing protest in Italy in 2011. Similarly, Accornero and Ramos 
Pinto (2015) observe that unions were more effective in initiating protests than ‘newer’ 
types of actors in Portugal. In total, 40 trade unions from 23 countries were involved in 
anti-austerity protests in 2010–11 (Larsson, 2013), and the European Trade Union 
Confederation mobilized strikes simultaneously in Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain on 
November 14, 2012, being the major event of transnational organization of labour 
conflict carried out in Europe in the last decades, although with moderate participation 
(Balbona & Begega, 2016). 
Despite the mobilizing will of union activists, these organizations faced various 
challenges in 2010-14. First, the progressive transfer of sovereignty from the national to 
the European level had undermined the institutional bases of unions’ power, based on 
collective bargaining and social dialogue (Bohle, 2011; Balbona & Begega, 2016). 
Secondly, a declining public trust in unions had reduced its mobilizing capacity in 
several countries (della Porta, 2012; Lobera, 2011b). This situation led unions to deploy 
new alliances with emerging autonomous groups, mostly with national or regional 
scopes. In certain cases, the position of the unions was visible and strong, as in most 
Portuguese protests and, later, the French Nuit Debout. In other cases, such as the 
Spanish mareas cívicas (‘civic tides’) and, more recently, the French Gilets jaunes, 
banners or symbols representing unions were actively rejected in their collective self-
representation. 
The Gilets jaunes movement was initiated by individual, inexperienced activists 
who used social media to create a politicized collective identity, first starting a 
change.org petition against the increase in fuel prices, followed by a Facebook event to 
‘block all roads’, and a viral video that suggested the use of the highly-visible yellow 
vests as a sign of a common identity. This movement was not associated with a specific 
political party or trade union. In these mobilizations — with vast proportions of 
10 
 
unaffiliated demonstrators — a collective identity was formed bottom-up through the 
interaction of participants with like-minded people in a ‘diffuse search for common 
denominators’ (Klandermans et al., 2014: 705), such as the use of the yellow vest — 
which the French law requires all motorists to possess when driving, making them 
widely available and recognizable. This leaderless, bottom-up process of collective 
identity formation was heavily affected by the renewed dynamics of the digital public 
sphere, particularly by the emergence of new political intermediations (Lobera & 
Sampedro, 2018), which have led to profound transformations of the organizational 
fields in society. Thus, select online communication spaces (such as certain Facebook 
groups, platforms like change.org, etc.) act as parainstitutions that mediate the flow of 
information and the organization of protesters, strongly influencing the evolution of 
mobilizations. 
Previously, in the case of Spain, the new organizers consciously rejected what 
they saw as the ‘old way of doing politics’ based on ideological or partisan affiliations 
because flags divide (Perugorría & Tejerina, 2013:433). They instead thought of 
themselves as a ‘community of ordinary citizens’ and encouraged individual messages 
and personalized handmade placards (Peterson et al., 2015). Their non-hierarchical 
organizational principle made them sceptical to collaboration with hierarchical 
organizations such as trade unions or political parties (Peterson et al., 2015). After the 
square occupiers vacated the acampadas, the Indignados movement devolved into 
numerous physical and online sites (Postill, 2017), in a period of great experimentation 
with old and new initiatives or ‘civic prototypes’ (Estalella & Corsín Jiménez, 2013). 
Some of them attained a great deal of popular support, notably the anti-eviction platform 
PAH and the ‘civic tides’.  
Coalition-building can be a powerful tool but, as Kloosterboer (2007: 56) notes, 
it’s a difficult task and normally starts with mutual mistrust. This was specially the case 
11 
 
in the Spanish mareas; in words of an activist interviewed by Köhler & Calleja (2015:251-
2): ‘[U]nions are exploiting the situation to regain credibility (...), but the movement wants 
to claim a purity that unions lack... What are you doing here?... You have done nothing 
until now’. Not without internal tensions, the ‘civic tides’ began in 2012 as non-
corporatist, ‘horizontal, inclusive and open movement to defend public services’ and 
‘against the cutbacks of social expenditure’ (ibídem). In their demonstrations and 
innovative forms of protest (flashmobs, escraches, theatre, human chains surrounding 
public equipment, etc.), common identity was not conveyed by organizations but by the 
colour of the ‘tide’ - white tides against cuts in the public health system, and green 
(yellow in Catalonia) in public education (Portos, 2016). Coalition-building was primarily 
bottom-up, driven by working partners taking part in the protests, both by union-
members and non-members. These relationships are often complex and difficult to 
study, but further analysis of these coalition-building processes may open new 
perspectives about the continuities and breaks of contemporary collective action. 
Novel features of Anti-Austerity protests  
The literature that has emerged on square movements has often portrayed them as 
unique (e.g. Langman, 2013; Perugorría & Tejerina, 2013). Anduiza et. al (2014), present 
evidence of some characteristics in the Spanish 15M that defy the established principles 
of the collective action paradigm: the 15M staging organizations were recently created, 
without formal membership and mainly online presence, they mobilized younger, more 
educated and less politically involved participants, and the main mobilization channels 
were personal contact and online social networks rather than co-members or broadcast 
media.  
Activist use of digital media 
Activist use of digital media played an instrumental role in the rapid diffusion of the 
protests and the mobilization of participants (see Casero-Ripollés, in this volume): e.g. 
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Facebook pages were used to mobilize, to draw back feedback from members (Kavada, 
2015) and to moderate the influence of repression on the diffusion of the movement (Suh 
et al., 2017), while tech and media activists set up alternative media publications, 
established autonomous technological infrastructures, and ran 24-hour livestreams 
(Costanza-Chock, 2014). Scholars note that the internet increased the power of 
entrepreneurial activists who can organize protests without costly and complex 
organizational infrastructures offered by conventional organizations (della Porta & 
Mosca, 2005); in short, ‘organizing without organizations’ (Earl et al., 2014; Klandermans 
et al., 2014).  
Arguably, this has led to a transformation of the structures of new social 
movements, challenging established views of what it means to be a ‘member’ 
(Chadwick, 2013), and leading to a new type of ‘connective action’ characterized as 
combining a lack of clear leadership, weak organizational structure, predominantly 
personal action frames, and the centrality of network technologies (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2013). However, other views suggest that proprietary platforms are built with 
certain characteristics that make them unsuitable for the creation of collective solidarity 
(Fenton & Barassi, 2011) or the development of a common identity (Juris, 2012), since 
their algorithms and design are geared towards corporate surveillance (Fuchs, 2014) and 
may be important factors in shaping collective action (Milan, 2015). In any case, activist 
uses of digital tools in the square movements were not detached from physical reality, 
since they were understood as a part of a broader project of re-appropriation of public 
space, which also involved assembling around 'occupied' places (Gerbaudo, 2012). 
Antioligarchic view of citizenship and new cross-class alliances 
The financial crisis fuelled a pre-existent democratic crisis. Public opinion data shows 
that the crisis was mostly perceived as a political crisis, not just an austerity crisis 
(Lobera & Ferrándiz, 2013). In this context, contesting ‘really existing democracy’ 
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engendered more visible outcomes than resisting austerity, to the point that, as Flesher 
Fominaya (2017: 4) points out, the post-2008 European mobilizations must be seen not 
only as ‘anti-austerity’ movements but crucially as pro-democracy movements. 
In fact, one of the main novelties of this cycle of contention consists in putting forward 
an ‘anti-oligarchic view of citizenship’ (Gerbaudo, 2017), particularly within the square 
movements, calling to ‘the 99%’ to confront the concentrated power of financial and 
political elites. The idea of citizenship, and the perception of its loss because of the 
elites, was used as the centre of the political situation framing, through what William 
Gamson (1992) called the ‘injustice frame’.  
Such a unifying role of the subject of the citizen is unambiguous in the Spanish context, 
where the discourse of citizenship was regularly wielded to trace ‘an explicit break from 
previous protest waves and their tendency towards self-ghettoisation’ (Gerbaudo, 2017: 
7). The new organizers aimed to unite the dispersed citizenry, building popular identity 
(Laclau, 2005) in these terms:  
We are not leftists, nor rightists. We are the underdogs and want to do away with the 
elite (15M slogan, 2011).  
Some of us consider ourselves progressive, others conservative. (…) Some of us 
have clearly defined ideologies, others are apolitical, but we are all concerned and 
angry about the political, economic, and social outlook, which we see around us: 
corruption among politicians, businessmen, and bankers leaving us helpless, 
without a voice. (Real Democracy Now Manifesto, 2011). 
 ‘They don’t represent us’ was a main slogan of the demonstrations. In the words 
of a 15M activist, with a new concept of citizenship the organizers aimed to mobilise the 
‘entirety of the citizenry and many people who had never taken part in a protest’ 
(Gerbaudo, 2017: 7).  And they succeeded. In few days, thousands of people took the 
14 
 
streets in 50 Spanish cities, integrating new profiles of protesters (Tejerina & Perugorría, 
2017). As it turned out, the movement and most of the critical stances that it defended 
were viewed very sympathetically by a majority of Spaniards, irrespective of their social 
and political affiliations (Sampedro & Lobera, 2014). This expanded its potential social 
base of participants and millions of Spaniards participated in their protests -9,75% of 
the population, nearly 3.4 million people-, as extracted from official public opinion data 
(CIS, #2920, 2011).  
 Square movements brought about an explosive growth and diversification of 
civic practices, particularly in Spain. The 15M movement actually transformed the 
language and practice of citizenship in the country (Postill, 2017) as well as the political 
behaviours’ main patterns in the Spanish digital public sphere (Lobera & Sampedro, 
2018), while shifting the way participants understand politics and citizenship (Feenstra et 
al., 2016). 
 Nevertheless, the implementation of deliberative models was not absent of 
difficulties. Feenstra et al. (2016: 10) note that the combination of a willingness to 
consensus with open deliberation meant that decision-making processes were easily 
susceptible to being sabotaged by small groups, making the process excessively ‘slow, 
laborious and demoralizing’. Arguably, the frustration in some activists derived from the 
difficulty of the deliberative processes (Calvo & Alvarez, 2015). In addition to this 
frustration, the emerging populist identity forged by the citizenism among the public 
opinion allowed the rise of new or revised progressive political parties (such as Syriza in 
Greece and Podemos in Spain) and municipal initiatives (such as Barcelona en Comú 
and Ahora Madrid) (Lobera & Rogero, 2017). 
 The emergence of the ‘citizenism’ as a strategic frame (e.g. Taibo, 2013) implied 
a more political than economic emphasis of the discourse (Gerbaudo, 2017). This 
brought little focus in the European sphere, since citizenism is almost implicitly oriented 
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to the national or local level. It is not that the EU and the Troika are not also blamed for 
the crisis and austerity, but the nation state is much more central as a stage and focus 
of collective action (Flesher Fominaya, 2015; 2017). Arguably, this raises a risk of 
national retrenchment, with possible negative consequences for the efficacy that social 
movements have in facing transnational power structures (Gerbaudo & Pianta, 2015). 
 In countries with a greater weight of the institutionalized left, though, there were 
significant anti-Troika mobilizations, including the ‘Fuck the Troika’ protests in Portugal 
(2012 and 2013), several general strikes in Greece, and anti-austerity protests in Ireland 
(2013) (Flesher Fominaya, 2017). In the opposite direction, in several former communist 
countries (such as Bulgaria and Czech Republic) a deep critique of neoliberal policies 
was absent, while protesters focused their demands on fixing the malfunctioning state 
with moderate calls for greater transparency and minimizing the scope of corruption 
(Císař & Navrátil, 2016; Rone, 2017). 
Continuities and breaks 
Existing scholarship on square movements has mostly stressed the elements of 
continuity with the GJM or the so-called anti-globalization protests, particularly with 
autonomous movements (see Daphi, this volume; see Giugni and Grasso, this volume). 
Some elements of continuity were ‘the presence of common activists in both 
movements […] and the strong cultural influence of the anti-globalisation movement on 
contemporary practices’ (Gerbaudo, 2017: 5), particularly on diagnostic framing, 
repertoires, and forms of organization (Zamponi & Daphi, 2014). Flesher Fominaya (2017: 
2) emphasizes the fact that ‘the “twin” crises’ were framed ‘synergistically’ as a 
continuation of the ‘double critique levelled by the GJM against neoliberal capitalist 
globalization and illegitimate, ineffective representative democracy’, but now framed 
within the aftermath of the austerity policies. Yet, student movements in Italy and Spain 
played key roles in influencing the respective anti-austerity mobilizations and discourse 
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in those countries, transforming ‘the anti-neoliberal discourse’ of the GJM into ‘an anti-
austerity discourse’ (Zamponi & Fernández, 2016).  
 As Tejerina et al. (2013: 381) note, the ‘centrality of inequality as the main force’ 
in this cycle of mobilization calls for rethinking previous decades of analyses ‘focused 
mainly, or solely, on issues of culture and collective identity’. In this vein, Peterson et al. 
(2015:13-4) see in this ‘materialist turn’ a ‘reawakening’ of class conflict between labour 
and capital and warn that part of the literature obliterated the presence of old actors in 
this cycle of mobilizations. 
 Continuities of longer duration have been drawn, particularly with the American 
New Left of the 1960s, around shared goals, traits and themes (Díez García, 2017), and 
the May ’68 protests (Romanos, 2018) around their self-management model of 
organization and the development of both concepts and practices of direct democracy. 
Arguably, these aspects would be embedded in a broader ‘participatory democracy 
turn’ (Bherer et al., 2016) affecting public and private spaces since the 1960’s and, more 
specifically, the autonomous activists in Europe (Flesher Fominaya, 2015), which have 
adopted a more ‘pragmatic radical reformist strategy’ pursuing ‘the recuperation and 
opening up of state institutions’ (Gerbaudo, 2017: 2) and more participatory strategies to 
(re)mobilize their members and citizens (della Porta, 2013). 
 Additionally, this cycle of contention presented a high degree of transnational 
diffusion, where the Spanish 15-M movement is considered to be ‘a model for European 
anti-austerity movements with far reaching influence’, and its epicentre, Acamapada Sol, 
the ‘most influential square in Europe’ (Flesher Fominaya, 2017: 11). Its claims for ‘Real 
Democracy Now!’, squarely directed at national oligarchies, found resonance in other 
parts of the globe, e.g. shaping the protests of Occupy Wall Street (OWS) (Lawrence, 
2012; Romanos, 2016b). As this cycle of contention clearly shows, transnational 
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diffusion processes are complex and reciprocal, rather than linear as transmitter-adopter 
models would suggest (see Romanos, in this volume). 
Explaining differences between European anti-austerity mobilizations 
Although mobilizations were partly a response to the crisis, the economic effects of the 
crisis and austerity policies are insufficient to explain their variations across countries 
strongly affected (Flesher Fominaya, 2017). Movements’ characteristics do not fully 
explain, either, large differences in mobilizations results of the same organizers; i.e. why 
some autonomous groups had difficulties mobilizing broader support in some 
circumstances, while the same organizations played a paramount role in organizing 
mass mobilizations a few months later (Peterson et al., 2015). The high situational 
variability in this cycle of contention draws attention also to a list (necessarily incomplete 
here) of other factors that should be considered. 
Frames and Public Trust 
In the early stages of the cycle of contention, trade unions were the single most active 
civil society actor organizing protest in most countries, thanks to their capacity to 
mobilize their members and their resources as bureaucratic organizations, and mostly 
projecting their conventional messages of resistance to the loss of labour rights. 
Nevertheless, they mostly obtained a rather moderate impact in terms of mobilizing new 
social groups and having greater social resonance, arguably due to a long-term erosion 
of public trust in most of the European countries. However, autonomous actors across 
Europe ‘perceive[d] the crisis as a political crisis rather than a reaction to austerity’ 
(Kaldor & Selchow, 2013:78) and, once these mobilizations started, their resonance 
across mainstream public opinion was unusually loud (Flesher Fominaya, 2017: 9): the 
initiators’ message connected directly with the widespread political anger and 
dissatisfaction about the long-term crisis of legitimacy of representative democracy in 
the continent. In this vein, Flesher Fominaya notes that the presence or absence of a 
18 
 
strong pro-democracy narrative helps explain significant anti-austerity mobilization in 
countries having ‘little austerity’ (Germany) and conversely its feeble presence where 
there was ‘strong austerity’ (Ireland) (2017: 4).  
 Hence, the role of initiator movements in forging ‘master frames’ that emerge 
early in the cycle is paramount (e.g. Whittier, 2007), but not lesser are the ‘sender’ 
characteristics, particularly their ability to generate trust among the public. Arguably, a 
high visibility of bureaucratic organizations in the protests moderated their ability to 
mobilize, in a sustained manner, new social groups in the Italian mobilizations (Andretta 
& della Porta, 2015; Zamponi, 2012) and the French Nuit Debout (Lobera & Martín, 
2017), whereas the principles of non-representation and horizontality facilitated new 
cross-class alliances in the emergence of both the Spanish Indignados and the French 
Gilets jaunes. 
Public Demand for Mobilization 
Differences in characteristics and strategies of movements are crucial but also 
insufficient to explain their impact. A contextual translation of a ‘new model’ of 
mobilization (the square movements’ organizing without organizations) did not guarantee 
high impacts, yet other factors outside the movements were of great importance in the 
mobilization ecosystem. Arguably, promoters’ strategies and characteristics are 
constantly engaging with a certain public demand for mobilization (e.g. Klandermans, 
2013). The increase in this demand may help to explain the increase in the mobilizing 
capacity of some groups in a matter of months. This public demand sympathizes with 
some groups’ characteristics more than with others, and with some types of protest 
more than others, causing differences in their ability to mobilize. 
 In this behalf, the way the 15M emerged is linked with the specific political 
opportunities present in the Spanish case. The successful organizers’ call took place 
one week before the regional and municipal elections, whereas previous similar calls 
19 
 
didn’t have that effect. The particular media structure and attention to political events 
during the electoral campaign favoured a rapid diffusion of the initial events across mass 
media. Hence, cases of rapid and massive mobilization (such as the 15M and the Gilets 
jaunes) would correspond to contexts of high public demand for mobilization with 
widespread, deeply felt indignation (Walgrave & Manssens, 2000) where organizers 
successfully connected their frames with a broad and cross-sectional consensus 
(Lobera, 2015), recruiting high proportions of unaffiliated demonstrators thought ‘open’ 
communication channels (Klandermans et al., 2014), such as mass media, online social 
networks, friends and acquaintances. 
Practices, Spaces and Experience 
A sustained participation beyond episodic mass mobilizations was facilitated by the use 
of deliberative democratic practices in large public assemblies as a central organizing 
principle (Flesher Fominaya, 2014). This occurred in contexts of high erosion of political 
legitimacy, remarkably in Spain and Greece, ‘as people withdrew commitment to the 
social order, creating spaces for alternative views and understandings’ (Langman, 2013: 
159). The peaceful and sustained occupations of public spaces in the center of the cities 
allowed the development of an eventful ‘continuous protest’, having relevant cognitive, 
affective and relational transformative impacts on its participants (della Porta, 2008). In 
this vein, Dhaliwal (2012: 256) notes that these occupations were ‘not simply a seizure 
and reorganization of physical space, conceived as an instrumental resource for the 
purposes of mobilization and publicity’, but they were also ‘attempts to produce an 
alternative form of public space’ undergirding a sustained transformation of social 
relations. 
 Flesher Fominaya’s (2017: 8) research on Spain and Ireland shows that the 
presence of experienced activists was also crucial for sustaining mobilization: activists in 
Madrid and Barcelona ‘drew on long-standing autonomous practices in and beyond the 
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GJM, to organize their assemblies (with facilitators, moderators, rules of engagement, 
etc.)’ while activists in Dublin ‘struggled to establish shared codes of practice that could 
integrate participants effectively’. In the absence of a strong core of experienced 
activists, movements faced more difficulties in their ability to sustain horizontal assembly 
practices. Pre-existing networks and urban spaces of resistance were paramount in the 
evolution of the protests after the acampadas were lifted. As Flesher Fominaya stresses 
(2017: 8), if Madrid’s ‘Indignados’ could decide to ‘go back to the neighbourhoods’ it 
was because they had somewhere to go (e.g. squatted social centres, neighbourhood 
association locales), while Irish activists struggled with a scarcity of available meeting 
spaces and their mobilization declined until it was unsustainable. 
Media, Diffusion and Timing 
Mainstream media and its ability to influence public opinion are deemed to be very 
important external factors for a movement’s efforts to mobilize political support, to 
reinforce the legitimacy of its demands, and to allow it to broaden the scope of conflict 
beyond those who are like-minded (Koopmans, 2004). In the case of the anti-austerity 
movement in the UK, mainstream media resonance was mixed (Cammaerts, 2018), while 
in the Spanish case it was predominantly positive in its emergence phase, even among 
right-wing TV stations. Furthermore, violence or its media framing were demobilizing 
factors in certain cases, such as Italy (Zamponi, 2012) and the UK (Cammaerts, 2018). 
These cases connect with evidences showing that perceived violence can potentially 
reduce public support for the protesters’ movement and, thus, potential participation 
(e.g. Anduiza & Muñoz, 2017), as well as enhancing elite’s discourses based on public 
order maintenance (Wasow, 2017). 
 Additionally, cultural and linguistic differences were of great importance in the 
way transnational diffusion took place (e.g. Gerbaudo, 2012; Romanos, 2016b). In this 
diffusion, timing mattered to a great extent. As Zamponi (2012) notes, path dependency 
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and pre-existing protest traditions can have adverse effects for subsequent 
mobilizations that impede them instead of stimulating them. 
Conclusions: Mobilizing without flags? Affiliation distrust in demand-driven 
mobilizations 
Unconventional types of mobilizing structures were forged in some of the more 
disruptive anti-austerity protests in Europe. Both the Spanish Indignados and, more 
recently, the French Gilets jaunes (despite their differences) successfully mobilized large 
numbers of unaffiliated demonstrators without the traditional mechanisms of 
membership organizations. Rejecting partisan flags, entrepreneurial activists organized 
protests using open channels of recruitment, such as online social networks, 
interpersonal networks and mass media coverage. If it can be assumed that ‘movements 
that are successfully supplying what potential participants demand gain more support 
than movements that fail to do so’ (Klandermans, 2013: 2), then, the evidence in this 
chapter suggests that, in most European societies, there is an increasing demand for 
‘mobilization without flags’, at least when confronting the outcomes of austerity 
measures and the political crisis. This shift can increase the influence of both 
autonomous movements, particularly visible in the case of the Spanish Indignados 
(Flesher Fominaya, 2015, 2017), and connective action mechanisms (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2013), paramount to the emergence of the Gilets jaunes. 
 A key factor contributing to the demand of this type of mobilization is a high 
degree of ‘affiliation distrust’ among several social groups, leading to the point that the 
presence of unions or partisan organizations would discourage participation. Some 
potential demonstrators prefer not to attend to a protest to avoid giving support to any 
conventional organization or to their leaders: they may fear that their political 
involvement could be used as a sort of backing or ‘soft affiliation’ by some organizers in 
order to legitimize their position. Some observers even point out that a part of the Gilets 
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jaunes movement extended their hatred of politicians to any ‘would-be politicians who 
emerge from their own ranks’ (Lichfield, 2018: 1). 
 I understand this affiliation distrust as a diffuse expression of the long-run crisis 
of institutional representation (Norris, 2011), that adds to the rest of the mechanisms 
identified by Klandermans et al (2014) affecting the proportion of unaffiliated 
demonstrators: 1) the universalistic or particularistic type of the protest, and 2) the 
individual’s level of embeddedness in multi-organizational fields. Thus, the number of 
trade union or partisan flags and placards in universalistic demonstrations would be, 
roughly, inversely proportional to the number of unaffiliated demonstrators and the less 
socially embedded citizens. For this type of protesters, a horizontal organization has the 
advantage of avoiding ‘being used’ by visible leaders to play in the representative field. 
The increasingly relevance of affiliation distrust in protests implies a rising need for the 
study of the dynamics of mobilization without flags, which potentially may lead to rapid 
processes with a high degree of social cross-sectional support among the public 
(Sampedro & Lobera, 2014), coming into play the mass media coverage (Walgrave & 
Manssens, 2000), the effect of experienced activists and autonomous movements 
(Flesher Fominaya, 2015, 2017; Juris, 2012), online social networking (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2013), and the dynamics of public opinion and consensus building (Gamson, 
1992; Klandermans, 2013). 
 There is no disintermediation, but new intermediations in the organization of the 
participants. The gap left by membership organizations can be taken by experienced 
activists (as in the case of 15M) and by a greater weight of connective platforms (as in 
the emergence of the Gilets jaunes). How these new intermediations are produced will 
determine, to a large extent, the evolution and nature of mobilizations without 
membership organizations. For instance, scholarship shows that less affiliated 
participants decide to participate at a later point in time (Klandermans et al., 2014), but 
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in the Gilets jaunes case we can observe the opposite mechanism: the initiators 
(individual unexperienced activists) were little embedded in organizational fields, so they 
rely on open channels (mainly Facebook, mass media, and interpersonal networks), 
recruiting mainly unaffiliated participants in a first stage. In this case, after a few weeks 
of doubts due to the marked nationalist, and occasionally racist, discourse of the 
movement in its phase of emergence (Nabli, 2018), left organizations and affiliated 
participants joined, influencing the evolution of the protests and taking their demands to 
more conventional positions of left activism (Damgé, 2018). This reverse dynamic (more 
affiliated participants adding later to the mobilization) may imply a series of challenges.  
 The emergence of massive, rapid, non-membership mobilizations (such as the 
15M and the Gilets jaunes) challenges the traditional dynamics of contentious politics. 
Traditionally, political and social change has been mostly explained as the ability of 
organizations, social movements, or revolutionary parties to mobilize oppressed groups 
against a status quo. In this ‘push’ dynamics, the organization cognitively liberates and 
organize the individuals and, in return, receives their commitment, the uniformity of the 
voices prevailing. But today, in most European cities mobilization opportunities are 
constantly offered: To what extend are the organizers the ones who mobilize or are the 
citizens who mostly ‘use’ the protest opportunities that are regularly organized? 
Individuals choose when and what space they use to meet their mobilization needs. It is 
the main force that shapes these types of mobilizations: the public demand decides 
what form of mobilization to support. In this context, the role of experienced activists is 
even more important: in addition to the processes of sensitization, diffusion, and 
organization of protests, a central aspect is their capacity to articulate a medium-term 
commitment of a significant part of the participants in the protests, without the 
traditional tools of membership. 
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 Without a known organization flag, without a previous record of actions, 
mobilizations without organizations may be articulated around meanings that are plastic 
or floating: democracy, citizenship, justice. This allows the construction of a populist 
identity, uniting protesters in their struggle: 'us' (that are the unjust victims of austerity 
measures) against 'them' (representing an economic and a political elite) (see 
Woodward, this volume). Massive mobilization around these meanings can produce the 
emergence of a ‘plastic moment’, in which ‘everything seems possible’ and new cross-
class alliances may be established (Lobera & Parejo, 2019). In the Spanish case, the 
presence of experienced left-wing activists allowed the adoption of forms of mobilization 
of the GJM, favouring the development of an inclusive populist mobilization.  
 Bearing this in mind, is there a risk that a ‘plastic moment’ could lead to an 
exclusive populist logic? Could this type of mobilization be overflowed by experienced 
right-wing activists? My hypothesis is yes, since there is arguably a primacy of the 
signifier over the signified (Lacan, 1993), both in mass communication and in connective 
action. From this perspective, issues traditionally framed by progressive social 
movements may be appropriated by the far right, as indeed seems to have happened in 
early stages of the Gilets jaunes movement. In short, experienced activists will have a 
particularly decisive role in shaping the ideological/political orientation of this type of 
rapid, massive and demand-driven mobilization. 
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